

Out of Balance:

How the Durbin Amendment has Failed to Meet Its Promise

Electronic Payments Coalition

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Executive Summary

- Debit cards are one of the most popular forms of payment, allowing consumers to conveniently shop without needing to carry cash or manage a checkbook. Debit cards provide numerous benefits to the merchants who accept them, including increased sales, faster transactions, reduced costs of cash, and new retail channels.
- During the height of the pandemic, debit cards continued to rise in popularity as e-commerce and contactless payments gave consumers a safer way to shop and helped keep merchants in business.¹
- To cover the cost of each debit transaction, merchants pay a small fee to their banks and networks. This fee is known as the “merchant discount.” The merchants’ banks, in turn, pay cardholders’ banks a small fee known as “interchange.” While merchants typically acknowledge the benefits they receive from debit cards and other forms of electronic payments, they have historically protested the merchant discount fees used to fund these services.^{2,3}
- In response to these merchant complaints, Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (frequently referred to as the “Durbin amendment”) instructed the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to limit interchange fees for debit cards issued by banks holding more than \$10 billion in assets. The regulation, implemented in October 2011, restricted debit interchange fees to a base fee of \$0.21 plus 0.05% of the transaction value.⁴
- Proponents of the Durbin amendment argued that the interchange fee cap would benefit consumers because merchants would pass through the savings from lower interchange fees via lower prices. Opponents countered that the savings pass-through had not materialized in other countries where interchange fees were restricted, and that the Durbin amendment would harm consumers, small merchants, and community financial institutions in multiple ways.
- Eleven years later, it is clear that Durbin amendment opponents were ultimately proven correct. As a result of the price caps, consumers have less access to debit rewards programs and free checking accounts, pay higher banking fees, and can no longer choose the network they prefer to route their debit transactions — all while the promised lower prices have failed to materialize. The Durbin amendment had significant unintended consequences: it made access to debit cards and checking accounts more expensive, negatively impacting unbanked and underbanked consumers, particularly low-income adults.
- Meanwhile, while large merchants have profited a great deal from the Durbin Amendment’s debit interchange caps, many smaller merchants now face *higher* interchange costs due to the loss of small-ticket discounts, which were rendered economically infeasible when interchange fees were capped.
- Finally, although lawmakers attempted to exempt community financial institutions from the debit fee caps, in practice these entities have also experienced a decline in per-transaction interchange, even as they must shoulder more of the cost to maintain the electronic payments system.
- Since the Durbin amendment was implemented, numerous evaluations conducted by respected think tanks, academics, payment industry experts, and state and federal entities have analyzed and documented the negative unintended consequences the amendment has had on consumers, small businesses, and community banks and credit unions. Repeating this mistake for the credit card market would be an unmitigated disaster. The Durbin amendment should be repealed, not expanded.


I. BACKGROUND

For decades, the electronic payment system has allowed consumers to conveniently shop using a debit card, decreasing the need to carry cash or manage a checkbook ledger. As a result, debit cards remain exceedingly popular with consumers. In 2020, 43% of consumers reported that their debit card was their preferred payment option and debit cards were used in 28% of all transactions — topping all other options, including credit cards (27%) and cash (19%).⁵ The pandemic accelerated the transition from in-person shopping to online retail, and as mobile commerce continues to expand its footprint into consumers’ shopping behavior, debit card transactions are likely to play an even more prominent role.

A debit card transaction involves five main parties: the cardholder, the cardholder’s bank (the issuer), the merchant, the merchant’s bank (the acquirer), and the card network. Issuers offer deposit accounts, debit cards, and other account-related services to consumers, while acquirers provide accounts, card-reader technology, and transaction-processing services to merchants. Card networks, such as Visa, Mastercard, STAR, and Shazam, provide the infrastructure and services required to exchange information and funds between issuers and acquirers.

To pay for the services they receive in accepting debit cards and other electronic payments, merchants pay a small fee, called the “merchant discount fee.” As shown in Figure 1, the merchant discount fee is collected by the merchant’s bank and consists of three smaller fees: an acquirer fee, a network processing fee, and interchange. Each component of the merchant discount fee is set by, and paid to, a different entity, but the acquiring bank is responsible for collecting the full amount and then transmitting each component to the appropriate party. Interchange is the largest of the three components and is ultimately received by the cardholder’s bank (i.e., the issuer), where it is used to fund system improvements (e.g., research and development of new security technologies and fraud prevention techniques) and cardholder incentives. Notably, while card issuers ultimately receive the interchange fee paid by the merchant to its acquiring bank, the fee is actually set by the payment network used in the transaction.

Figure 1: Overview of a \$100 Electronic Payment Transaction



1.1 Two-Sided Markets and the Value of Interchange

Unlike most markets in which a seller provides a product or service to one group of buyers, the market for electronic payments (including debit) is two-sided. In a two-sided market, a platform or service serves multiple end-users (in this case, cardholders and merchants), and the value that each group derives from using the platform depends on the extent to which the other group participates. In the electronic payments market, cardholders benefit from holding a card only if it is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if enough consumers use it. In this way, the e-payments market bears some similarity to the market for newspapers, which have both advertisers and subscribers as customers, and platforms like Open Table, where both diners and restaurants benefit.

For a two-sided market to maximize participation and operate effectively, the two end-user groups may not pay the same price. As a result, the price to participate in the electronic payments system — of which interchange is a key component — has historically been balanced in a manner that allows card issuers to use those funds to increase the number of cardholders and attract merchants, thereby benefiting all market participants.⁶ Since flexible interchange rates make it possible for issuers to deliver maximum value for both merchants and consumers, government intervention on behalf of one side of the market (e.g., the Durbin amendment’s interchange fee caps that lower costs to merchants) can have adverse consequences on the other side of the market (consumers) and ultimately harm the overall system.

Supreme Court Recognizes Two-Sided Card Markets: Ohio v. American Express

The two-sided nature of the card payments market recently appeared at the center of the U.S. Supreme Court’s July 2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express. In its ruling, the Court held that American Express’s anti-steering provisions, which prohibit merchants from discouraging customers’ American Express card use at the point of sale to avoid fees, do not violate federal antitrust laws. In delivering its opinion, the Court determined that in a two-sided market, both sides of the platform must be assessed when determining whether a practice is anticompetitive. Since Ohio and other plaintiffs had focused exclusively on the price increase on the merchant side of the market and ignored the impact on cardholders, they failed to show that the anti-steering rules adversely impacted the market as a whole. As stated by the Court:

[The] plaintiffs’ argument about merchant fees wrongly focuses on only one side of the two-sided credit card market...the credit card market must be defined to include both merchants and cardholders. Focusing on merchant fees alone misses the mark because the product that credit card companies sell is transactions, not services to merchants, and the competitive effects of a restraint on transactions cannot be judged by looking at merchants alone.

To achieve widespread participation in the debit card payments market, issuers offer incentives to consumers and key services to merchants that are supported by interchange fee revenue. For example, cardholders benefit from programs like fraud protection and rewards (funded in part by interchange), while merchants who accept debit cards receive a variety of benefits in return for what they pay. These benefits include:

- **Increased sales.** Since customers are not limited to spending the cash they have on hand, merchants who accept cards typically enjoy higher sales. This phenomenon is significant: debit and credit card transactions are two to four times larger than cash transactions, and when a merchant first begins to accept card payments, they experience a 10% to 15% increase in average transaction size.⁷ This effect can also be seen with “Buy Now, Pay Later” installment plans, which have gained popularity with many consumers. Many retailers are willing to pay fees to BNPL providers as high as 7% of the cost of the product — well over double the average interchange fee for credit cards and seven times higher than for debit cards — because of the prospect for increased sales and customer loyalty.⁸
- **Faster transaction time.** Electronic payments are twice as fast as cash transactions and several times faster than checks, which improves customer throughput and satisfaction. This is a key benefit to many merchants, who prioritize moving customers quickly through the checkout process.⁹
- **Additional retail channels.** Electronic payments allow merchants to access other sales channels through e-commerce and mobile commerce avenues, which are growing rapidly. Nearly three-quarters of small business operators say that accepting credit cards brings in additional business.¹⁰ Electronic card innovations, like tap-to-pay and contactless payments, were especially important during the Covid-19 pandemic: from the second half of 2020 to the first half of 2021, the share of consumers who had a contactless card and used it rose from 60% to 84%.¹¹
- **Reduced cost of cash.** Card acceptance reduces costs associated with counting, storing, safeguarding, and transporting cash, and it limits losses from mislaid or stolen cash – all of which are significant expenses that merchants sometimes overlook. A recent study by a retail industry research firm found that the average retailer spends more than 9% of the value of their cash transactions counting, auditing, and depositing cash.¹² In dollar terms, U.S. and Canadian retailers spent more than \$96 billion on cash-handling activities in 2017.¹³
- **Prompt, guaranteed payments.** Beyond helping merchants avoid the costs of cash, electronic payments reduce the risks to merchants associated with credit loss. Electronic payments are deposited directly into the merchant’s account, and issuers, not merchants, take responsibility for losses if a customer who uses a credit card is ultimately unable to pay.¹⁴

1.2 The Durbin Amendment

While merchants benefit in myriad ways from the electronic payments system, they have historically protested the interchange fees used to fund these services. In response to these complaints, Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (frequently referred to as the “Durbin amendment” after its primary sponsor, Senator Richard Durbin) instructed the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the Fed) to limit interchange fees for debit cards issued by banks holding more than \$10 billion in assets.

The Fed subsequently issued Regulation II: Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing (“Regulation II”), which restricted debit card interchange fees to a base fee of \$0.21 plus 0.05% of the transaction value.¹⁵ These

restrictions were implemented in October 2011, and, since then, neither the debit card interchange fee nor the \$10 billion threshold have been adjusted for inflation. As a result, the \$0.21 cap on fees in June 2023 is equivalent to \$0.15 in 2011 — 29% lower in real terms than when it was implemented over a decade ago. With heightened inflation, the cap is decreasing at an even faster rate.

Due to inflation, the Durbin amendment's \$0.21 interchange cap is now 29% lower than regulators originally intended.

Proponents of the Durbin amendment argued that Regulation II would help both merchants and consumers because merchants would pass through the savings accrued from lower interchange fees to consumers via lower prices. However, in failing to recognize the two-sided nature of the debit card payments market, advocates did not consider the losses that would accrue to one market end-user (consumers) given that the other end-user (merchants) would contribute billions less to maintain the electronic payment system. Durbin amendment proponents also failed to consider the ancillary, unintended impact of the regulation on small merchants and community financial institutions. Indeed, following the implementation of the regulation, financial institutions have seen interchange income decline by around 25%.¹⁶ This revenue had been used to fund bank services. As a result, consumers and small merchants have also borne tremendous costs.

II. CONSUMER LOSSES

In lobbying for an interchange fee cap, proponents of the Durbin amendment argued that consumers would benefit because merchants would face lower costs and pass these savings to consumers in the form of lower prices. In practice, however, the opposite has occurred: over the last 12 years, merchants have reaped more than \$100 billion (and counting) in interchange-related savings,¹⁷ while study after study has demonstrated that consumers are left footing the bill. For example, consumers have experienced a sharp decline in the availability of debit card rewards programs — a predictable result given the nature of the two-sided market — as well as decreased availability of free checking accounts, higher minimum balance requirements, and higher fees.¹⁸ These effects have disproportionately affected low-income consumers who struggle to meet the more stringent minimum balance requirements, are less able to afford higher fees, and are more likely to be unbanked or underbanked.¹⁹ Two years after the regulation was implemented, researchers at the University of Chicago estimated that the value of losses to consumers fell between \$22 and \$25 billion, a value that has undoubtedly increased by tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars over the ensuing decade.²⁰

2.1 Lost Rewards

Prior to the enactment of the Durbin amendment, consumers frequently benefitted from reward programs tied to their debit card spending. Offered by about one-third of debit card issuers, such programs allowed customers to earn points redeemable for merchandise, gift cards, and cash that returned up to 20% of a cardholder's spending to his or her account.^{21,22} However, following the establishment of Regulation II and the loss of the interchange income used to back rewards, debit card issuers withdrew most of these programs.²³ For example, in the months leading up to Regulation II's implementation, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Sun Trust, and PNC Bank each announced that they would no longer offer debit card rewards.²⁴ After the passage of the Durbin amendment, data from Phoenix Marketing International shows that the percentage of debit

cardholders who received rewards from those cards fell by 30%.²⁵ Similarly, a study conducted by consultancy Oliver Wyman found that within one year of the enactment of the Durbin amendment, 30% of covered issuers eliminated or downsized their debit card rewards programs, and a total of 81% did not plan to offer a rewards program in the future.²⁶

Given the two-sided nature of the debit card market, it is entirely predictable that a requirement for networks to reduce the price for one end-user (merchants) would lead to an effective price increase on the other end-user (consumers) via the elimination of rewards. Indeed, the same outcome can be observed in other countries that have experimented with interchange fee caps. As researchers at George Mason University noted, “for all countries outside the United States that have imposed price controls on interchange fees, the very point of doing so was to impose higher prices and reduced services for card users.”²⁷ For example, in 2002, the Reserve Bank of Australia sought to curb the generosity of credit card rewards programs and credit card use by issuing a set of regulations that sharply reduced credit card interchange fees.²⁸ These regulations led issuers to immediately curtail their rewards programs, causing the value of credit card rewards points to decline by 23 percent.²⁹

2.2 Reduction in Free Checking

The Durbin amendment has also led to a decline in the availability of free checking. A 2017 Federal Reserve study found that as a result of capping debit interchange fees, banks were 35% less likely to offer consumers free checking. Based on this finding, the authors estimated that if the Durbin amendment had not been passed, twice as many consumers would enjoy free checking than at the time of the study — translating to tens of millions of consumers who now face checking account fees as a direct result of the Durbin amendment.³⁰ A study by Harvard researchers reached a similar conclusion: after the Durbin amendment was passed, the share of banks offering free checking fell by 42 percent.³¹ Recently, the share of no-fee, noninterest checking accounts has begun to recover, rising to 48% in 2021.³² However, these free accounts have come at the expense of other rising fees (see Figure 2).


A byproduct of the reduction in free checking that resulted from the Durbin amendment was that many consumers faced more stringent minimum balance requirements. According to the Federal Reserve Board, banks covered by Regulation II increased the average minimum balance requirement for noninterest checking accounts by \$400 (+50%), while for interest-bearing checking accounts, minimum balance requirements rose by \$1,700 (+55%).³³ If these minimum balances are not met, consumers are assessed a monthly fee.

Banks also responded to the Durbin amendment by raising monthly maintenance fees, which consumers incur if they fail to meet minimum balance requirements. A Federal Reserve Board study found that banks raised monthly fees on noninterest checking accounts by 20% and on interest-bearing checking accounts by 17% in response to Regulation II.³⁴ A more recent study from University of Pennsylvania researchers found that the Durbin amendment led average checking account fees to rise from \$4.34 to \$7.44, a 71% increase.³⁵

The American experience with interchange fee caps and rising bank fees mirrors that of other countries following the implementation of similar restrictions. For example, following interchange restrictions in Australia, annual fees on standard rewards cards rose 47%, while annual fees on gold rewards cards increased by 77 percent.³⁶ Similarly, a study published in the Review of Network Economics found that in response to

interchange fee regulations, bank service charges to Australian cardholders rose to offset a portion of the AU\$490 million (about \$350 million) that issuers lost in interchange revenue.³⁷

Figure 2: Changes to Noninterest Checking Accounts, Pre- and Post- Regulation II, From January 2009 to June 2014



Source: Government Accountability Office (2022) & Manuszak, M. and Wozniak, K. (2017).

2.3 Disproportionate Harm to Low-Income Consumers

The reduction in debit rewards and free checking combined with higher minimum balance requirements and account fees have made it more difficult for some consumers to afford a bank account. Underbanked and unbanked populations, who are usually low-income consumers, have likely been disproportionately affected by rising costs of checking accounts. Research suggests that the combination of higher balance requirements

“We find little evidence of across-the-board consumer savings. Our analysis suggests that consumers are not helped by this interchange regulation.”

—Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

and higher fees levied on consumers who cannot meet the higher balance requirements has driven some consumers out of the banking system and into alternative arrangements that are generally more expensive in the long run.

- **Loss of debit rewards:** The loss of debit rewards has proved particularly acute for lower-income households. Per the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, low-income and moderate-income consumers tend to rely more on debit cards than credit cards,³⁸ and they are significantly less likely to switch their spending to credit cards than are middle to upper-income consumers.³⁹ This is partially due to the fact that lower-income households are less likely to own a credit card: according to the Federal Reserve, more than 94% of households earning more than \$50,000 per year) have at least one credit card, compared to 56% of households earning less than \$25,000 per year.⁴⁰ Because lower-income consumers are less likely to have a credit card, they had less opportunity to recoup their lost debit card rewards.
- **Financial vulnerability in the unbanked population:** Not surprisingly, lower-income Americans are less likely to have access to the traditional banking system than middle- and upper-income consumers.⁴¹ The Durbin amendment likely exacerbated this problem. In a GAO analysis of FDIC data, the most frequently cited reason a consumer does not have a bank account is insufficient funds to meet a minimum balance requirement. As a result, unbanked households often turn to alternative financial services to meet their needs. Per GAO, from 2015 to 2019, about half of unbanked households used nonbank transaction services (e.g., check cashing or money orders).⁴² Not only are these services often more expensive than those offered by a traditional bank, they do not help consumers build a credit history to unlock access to lower cost loans and payment methods.⁴³ As such, the effective cost of the Durbin amendment for low-income consumers may be greater than the increase in bank fees and loss of rewards programs suggests.⁴⁴

“Debit card interchange fee limits imposed by the Durbin Amendment and Regulation II are associated with increases in the costs of checking accounts.”

— U.S. Government Accountability Office

While some unbanked and underbanked individuals have returned to the traditional banking system in recent years, the Durbin amendment nevertheless led to higher costs for maintaining a checking account, particularly for consumers who are least able to afford higher and more frequent account maintenance fees.⁴⁵ As researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston correctly more than a decade ago in a prescient warning, “poorer consumers tend to prefer debit cards to credit cards...[which] is an important fact to keep in mind for policymakers who seek to regulate debit and credit markets.”⁴⁶

2.4 Loss of Routing Choice

In addition to establishing an interchange fee cap, the Durbin amendment introduced network anti-exclusivity and routing provisions requiring that all U.S. debit cards issuers have two unaffiliated debit networks to their cards. This lesser-known component of the regulation mandates that merchants, rather than consumers, select which network is used to process transactions. Routing and anti-exclusivity provisions thus eliminate consumer choice, since cardholders no longer have the option to select the debit network that reflects their preferences

on payment speed, reliability, and security. Instead, the Durbin amendment allows merchants to re-route debit transactions from among networks chosen by the issuer, granting merchants both the ability and incentive to select the network with the lowest fees, regardless of its commitment to security.⁴⁷ This could mean that consumers, who think that their transactions are being routed over long-established, recognizable, and trusted networks, are more exposed to fraud risk while alternative networks have less incentive to invest in their technology platforms or innovative data security measures.⁴⁸

2.5 Promised Price Cuts Fail to Materialize

Proponents of the Durbin amendment argued that merchants would pass along the savings they accrued from lower interchange fees to consumers via lower prices. In practice, however, study after study has shown that such price reductions have failed to materialize. One comprehensive analysis undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond shows that only 1% of merchants reduced prices in the wake of lower debit fee acceptance costs. Most (77%) did not adjust prices at all, and 22% actually *raised* them.⁴⁹ As the study states, “few merchants [reduce] prices or debit restrictions as debit costs decrease.”

Other independent research corroborates these findings. For example, researchers at the University of Chicago have concluded that merchants did not fully pass through their savings to consumers.⁵⁰ Similarly, a 2013 MasterCard survey found that only 3% of merchants intended to pass on savings,⁵¹ and in 2019 researchers at the University of Pennsylvania found little evidence of across-the-board consumer savings and concluded that consumers were not helped by the Durbin amendment.⁵²

Consistent with the U.S. experience, savings pass through also failed to materialize following interchange fee regulation in Spain and Australia, where less than 5% of merchants reduced their prices.⁵³ Further, in 2016 the Reserve Bank of Australia acted to limit merchant surcharging for credit card use since they had begun charging consumers in excess of the cost of accepting cards — hardly the outcome one would expect if merchants were truly passing along interchange savings to their customers.⁵⁴

As summed up by Scott Strockoz, Deputy Regional Director of the FDIC:

Consumers were supposed to see lower retail prices due to the implementation of the Durbin amendment, [but] in many cases consumers are seeing higher prices...or no savings at all. Further, banks are increasing or implementing fees on traditional bank products and services, thereby increasing consumer cost. Consumers either have to pay the fees, find a new bank that doesn't charge those fees, or end their banking relationship and use an alternative financial service provider for their banking needs. In certain instances, these providers charge more in fees than a traditional bank, but they do not adequately disclose these fees in advance, so the consumer ends up paying more to a check casher or a payday lender than they would to their bank. It is unlikely consumers will see any tangible benefits from the Durbin amendment.⁵⁵

III. SMALL MERCHANT LOSSES

Advocates of the Durbin amendment widely held that the new interchange fee cap would provide a boost to merchants by reducing operating expenses and allowing them to hold on to more of their profits. While this may be the case for large merchants, a variety of research indicates that small merchants have, in fact,

experienced the opposite. Instead of enjoying promised cost reductions, many Main Street businesses have encountered rising debit card acceptance fees due to issuers withdrawing previously offered fee discounts on smaller purchases, which are no longer feasible under the Durbin amendment. Moreover, small merchants also risk losing valuable services received from issuers and card networks as the Durbin amendment reduces their incentive and ability to invest in the electronic payments system.

3.1 Lost Variation in Interchange Fee Rates

While large merchants have benefitted from the Durbin amendment and its restrictions on interchange fees, many small merchants now face higher debit card acceptance costs. This result is due to the loss of interchange discounts for small-ticket purchases. Prior to Regulation II, there was more variability in interchange fees depending on the type of merchant and size of purchases. Networks tailored fees in a manner that optimized income, risk exposure, and adoption rates, as would be expected in a well-functioning two-sided market. As a result, smaller merchants who tended to sell small-ticket items received discounts as a means of encouraging those merchants to accept debit cards. However, after the Durbin amendment was implemented, networks eliminated these discounts and moved to a flatter rate structure, which for some merchants (particularly Main Street stores who specialize in small-ticket items) caused their debit costs to increase rather than decrease.⁵⁶

For example, prior to the Durbin amendment, the interchange fee for signature debit purchases set by Visa and Mastercard on transactions involving small-ticket items of \$15.00 or less was 1.55% of the transaction value, plus \$0.04. This yielded an interchange fee of \$0.11 for a \$5.00 purchase. However, after the implementation of the Durbin amendment and ensuing elimination of small-ticket interchange discounts, the fee on that same \$5.00 transaction doubled to \$0.23.⁵⁷ To put the impact of this change into perspective, debit cards were used in 4.9 billion transactions below \$5.00 and 10.8 billion transactions between \$5.00 and \$15.00 in 2009 — collectively comprising more than one-fourth of all payment card transactions. This suggests that small merchants are now paying higher interchange fees on at least 15.7 billion transactions annually.⁵⁸ Research published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond supports these conclusions. According to the study, interchange fees increased for 31% of merchants and declined for just 11 percent.⁵⁹ Among merchants with small-ticket transactions, “nine times as many respondents (27% over 3%) reported a cost increase as those who reported a cost decrease.”

3.2 Loss of Valued Services

In addition to facing rising fees, small merchants also stand to lose valued services provided by card issuers and payments networks, such as monitoring and preventing fraud, implementing new fraud prevention technologies, and maintaining and improving the U.S. electronic payment system infrastructure. A study of small merchants conducted by Javelin Strategy & Research revealed that for most small merchants, the value of services received from electronic payments providers is more important to them than price. Specifically, the study concluded that

“After the implementation of the Durbin amendment and ensuing elimination of small-ticket interchange discounts, the fee on a \$5.00 transaction doubled.”

— Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

instead of seeking out payment processing packages that have the lowest possible fees, most small merchants care more about choice and flexibility than price. Further, merchants who demonstrate an understanding of the interchange process are overwhelmingly satisfied with the rates they pay and are more willing to pay a premium for higher-quality payment processing packages.⁶⁰

Furthermore, the Durbin amendment has limited banks' capacity to invest in new technologies to enhance the existing U.S. payments system. As noted by the Mercator Advisory Group, the Durbin amendment's restriction on interchange income has abruptly curtailed the funding issuers use to support innovation and investment in network operations. Unable to recoup their fixed development costs, "[banks'] willingness to spend money on innovation with regard to payments that fall within the interchange cap rule" has declined.⁶¹ The Mercator Advisory Group warns that this will lead to "less innovation in areas such as risk management, security, loyalty programs, product development, and user capital due to the limited capital available for investment."⁶²

Given the high value that small merchants place on high-quality issuer-provided services, the concerning corollary is that as regulators limit interchange prices, issuers may reduce the extent or quality of services offered if they are unable to recover their costs. Since small merchants have indicated that they are most satisfied when receiving more and higher quality services at higher prices, price-control prompted quality reductions are likely to reduce merchant satisfaction.⁶³ Ultimately, the Durbin amendment has paradoxically put small merchants in the position of paying more for less.

IV. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LOSSES


Community financial institutions like small banks and credit unions are crucial for consumers, particularly those in underbanked communities. Prior to the passage of the Durbin amendment, proponents posited that community financial institutions would remain unaffected by the regulation because institutions holding less than \$10 billion in assets were exempt. However, while smaller banks and most credit unions may be exempt in theory, in practice they have faced significant negative consequences.

Research shows that the repercussions of the Durbin amendment have echoed through the debit card payments market, driving down average interchange income for exempt community banks and credit unions alongside covered institutions. As the Congressional Research Service explains, because Regulation II split large and small banks by the cost of interchange, merchants now have more choice over the processing of debit transactions, putting pressure on smaller issuers to lower their own interchange fees.⁶⁴ Data from the Federal Reserve illustrate that the average inflation-adjusted interchange fee for exempt issuers has fallen. Indeed, compared to January 2011 — just before the Durbin Amendment took effect — the average inflation-adjusted interchange fee for "exempt" issuers dropped by more than 30% for single-message transactions and fell by 2% for dual-message, reducing total interchange revenue compared to what would have been generated without the Durbin Amendment (see Figure 3).⁶⁵ As a result, all banks have lost an estimated \$106 billion in real interchange revenue between October 2011 and the end of 2020.⁶⁶ This result is consistent with surveys of local banks and credit unions. For example, a Mercatus Center study found that the Durbin amendment had reduced earnings at nearly three-fourths of local financial institutions. Of these, roughly one-third reported facing a "significant negative impact," with loss estimates ranging from 7 to 30 percent.⁶⁷

Publicly available financial documents corroborate these findings, with many small banks, such as First Citizens Community Bank and Whitney Bank, ascribing millions of dollars in revenue losses to the Durbin amendment.⁶⁸

Others, including Banner Corporation and Eastern Bank, have described implementing complex, counterintuitive strategies to keep their assets below the \$10 billion threshold when reporting to the Fed to avoid the interchange fee cap and loss of revenue.⁶⁹ Many growing community financial institutions, such as Huntington Bank and American Savings Bank, have also reported interchange revenue losses after inevitably crossing the \$10 billion threshold, at which point they have suffered tens of millions of dollars in lost revenue.⁷⁰ Furthermore, Regulation II does not factor inflation into the \$10 billion threshold. The \$10 billion cap in July 2023 is equivalent to a \$7.3 billion cap in March 2011.

Figure 3: Debit Interchange Fees for Issuers Exempted from the Durbin Amendment, Average Fee per transaction, Chained 2019 Dollars, by Routing Type



Community banks are particularly vulnerable to large revenue losses. Local banks and credit unions have few alternative revenue streams to offset losses in interchange income, making it difficult to adapt to changes in their revenue composition.⁷¹ Additionally, reductions in interchange income disproportionately harm smaller financial institutions because their per-transaction debit processing costs are typically higher than those of larger banks due to economies of scale. As of 2019, Federal Reserve data showed the average per-transaction authorization, clearing, and settlement (ACS) costs for low-volume issuers (i.e., local banks and credit unions) were 20 times higher than those of high-volume issuers.⁷² Smaller institutions typically have a lower number

The average inflation-adjusted interchange fee for “exempt” issuers has fallen between 2 and 30 percent since 2011, and the Durbin amendment’s \$10 billion exemption threshold is equivalent to just \$7.2 billion today.

of debit transactions than larger covered issuers, which makes it more difficult for them to absorb ACS-related costs. Moreover, the Federal Reserve's figures underestimate the true cost to small issuers because they omit several cost components (e.g., transaction monitoring costs, customer inquiry and resolution costs, debit card compliance costs, debit card insufficient funds handling costs, card production and delivery costs, and account relationships costs). Pricing out small banks, credit unions, and community financial institutions has harmed vulnerable consumers and lessened natural competition in the Debit market.

A payments network is, at its core, an interdependent, interconnected cost sharing mechanism. Historically, most of the cost burden associated with running and maintaining the system has been borne by large banks that are covered by the Durbin amendment. These entities play a key role in enabling smaller institutions to participate and compete in the payment card market: there are over 4,000 banks and nearly 5,000 credit unions in the United States, but the small number of institutions covered by the Durbin amendment generate the vast majority of total debit volume, which largely funds the operation of electronic payments networks.⁷³ The Durbin amendment has consequently shifted more responsibility onto exempt banks with respect to cost-sharing, harming their bottom line and making it more difficult to offer high-quality and affordable banking services to their customers.⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

At the time of its passage, the Durbin amendment was hailed by its proponents as a boon to consumers, merchants, and community financial institutions who were struggling after the recession. However, in the years since the regulation's implementation, study after study has demonstrated that the amendment harmed each of these anticipated beneficiaries.

Today, consumers have lost access to debit rewards programs and free checking accounts. They pay higher banking fees, they can no longer choose the network they prefer to route their debit transactions, and they have yet to experience the lower prices promised by the retail industry. Lower-income households and underbanked communities have been particularly impacted by these consequences — especially by the loss of debit rewards, more stringent balance requirements, and higher fees — and some have left the traditional banking system in response. At the same time, big box stores and other large retailers have reaped the benefits of debit interchange caps, while many smaller merchants now face higher interchange costs due to the loss of small-ticket discounts. And while lawmakers attempted to exempt community financial institutions and credit unions, in practice these entities have also experienced a decline in per-transaction interchange and must now bear more of the cost to maintain the electronic payments system — a problem that will worsen over time given that neither the interchange cap nor the exemption cutoff are adjusted for inflation.

Despite the negative outcomes Regulation II has had on consumers, small businesses, and community financial institutions, some policymakers and retail industry advocates have proposed expanding the Durbin amendment to the credit card market. Doing so would impose even greater costs on these stakeholders while further padding the pocketbooks of big box retailers. Instead, policymakers should take heed of the evidence that has accumulated for more than a decade. The Durbin amendment has inflicted billions of dollars in unnecessary costs across the retail, banking, and consumer finance markets, and repeating this mistake for the credit card market would be an unmitigated disaster. The Durbin amendment should be repealed, not expanded.

APPENDIX: KEY STUDIES AND ANALYSES EXAMINING THE DURBIN AMENDMENT'S IMPACT

Author	Year	Title	Institution	Summary	Link
Buzek, G.	2018	Cash Multipliers: How Reducing the Costs of Cash Handling Can Enable Retail Sales and Profit Growth	IHL Group	Evaluates the high cost of cash-handling activities to businesses, finding that the cost of handling cash ranges from 4–15% of sales.	https://www.ihlservices.com/product/costofcash/
Chang, H., Evans, D., and Garcia-Swartz, D.	2005	The Effect of Regulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee Capping in Australia	Review of Network Economics	Assesses the impact of credit card interchange fee regulation on credit card issuers and merchants in Australia, finding that the regulation has resulted in the transfer of significant profits from bank issuers and cardholders to the merchant sector.	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=820044
Evans, D. and Schmalensee, R.	2018	Accounting for Two-Sided Business Reality Reduces False Negatives as Well as False Positives in Antitrust Decisions Involving Platform Enterprises	CPI Antitrust Chronicle	Describes the dynamics of two-sided markets and argues that both sides of a two-sided market must be evaluated to determine whether fees and pricing are competitive.	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3131288
Evans, D., Chang, H., and Joyce, S.	2013	The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Caps on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis	University of Chicago Law School, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics	Estimates the financial impact of the Durbin amendment on consumers, finding that the present discounted value of the losses to consumers as a result of the implementation of the Durbin amendment is \$22–25 billion over the regulation's lifetime.	http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1651&context=law_and_economics
Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.	2021	Interchange Fee Revenue, Covered Issuer Cost, and Covered Issuer and Merchant Fraud Loss Related to Debit Card Transactions	Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.	Presents annual data collected by the Federal Reserve Board showing that following the implementation of the Durbin Amendment, the average debit card interchange fee for technically exempt issuers has fallen between 2-22% depending on transaction type.	https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/regioreportsdata.pdf
Garces E., and Luces, B.	2018	Regulatory Intervention in Card Payment Systems: An Analysis of Regulatory Goals and Impact	The Brattle Group, Visa USA, Inc.	Analyzes the efficacy of regulatory interventions, including the Durbin Amendment, on consumer well-being. Presents evidence that such interventions did not achieve their stated goals, generally harming consumers and instead providing a rent transfer to merchants.	https://www.brattle.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/15608_regulatory_intervention_in_card_payment_systems_-_an_analysis_of_regulatory_goals_and_impact.pdf
Government Accountability Office	2022	Regulators Have Taken Actions to Increase Access, but Measurement of Actions' Effectiveness Could be Improved	Government Accountability Office	Examines factors associated with households' use of basic banking services, statutory and regulatory factors affecting service availability and cost, and the efforts of selected federal financial regulators to address these issues.	https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104468.pdf
Hubbard, B.	2013	The Durbin Amendment, Two-Sided Markets, and Wealth Transfers: An Examination of Unintended Consequences Three Years Later	University of Chicago Law School	Assesses the Durbin amendment's adverse consequences for banks, merchants, networks, payment processors, and consumers. The consequences include reduced consumer access to free checking and rewards programs; lack of savings pass-through from large retailers to consumers; and higher interchange fees for small merchants.	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2285105
Kay, B., Manuszak, M., and Vojtech, C.	2014	Bank Profitability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank Responses to the Durbin Amendment	Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.	Uses empirical methods to show that as a result of the Durbin amendment, banks subject to the regulation lost nearly \$14 billion in annual income and have only partially offset this loss by raising deposit fees (e.g., maintenance, minimum balance, overdraft, and ATM fees).	https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/201477pap.pdf
Lux, M. and Greene, R.	2016	Regressive Trends in Credit Card Access	Harvard Kennedy School, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government	Identifies regressive trends driving decreased credit and debit card usage among lower-income Americans, including a rise in financial regulatory restrictions like the Durbin amendment.	https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/Out_of_Reach_Lux_Greene_4_7.pdf
Manuszak, M. and Wozniak, K.	2017	The Impact of Price Controls in Two-sided Markets: Evidence from U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation	Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.	Uses empirical methods to show that banks subject to the Durbin amendment responded to the regulation by raising checking account prices, reducing the availability of free accounts, raising monthly fees, and increasing minimum balance requirements.	https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017074pap.pdf

Author	Year	Title	Institution	Summary	Link
McGinnis, P.	2013	Misguided Regulation of Interchange Fees: The Consumer Impact of the Durbin Amendment	Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Loyola Consumer Law Review	Examines the impact of the Durbin amendment on consumers, highlighting how reduced interchange fees have led to higher checking account fees without the potentially off-setting benefit of reducing retail prices.	https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1914&context=iclr
Moeser, M.	2017	Small Merchants on Interchange: Value More Important than Cost	Javelin Strategy & Research	Analyzes a survey of 500 small merchants, finding that the vast majority see interchange fees as a necessary cost of doing business, derive value from the benefits that come with these costs, and are more satisfied with their relationships with issuing banks when they are allowed to choose and pay for additional benefits.	http://www.electronicpaymentscoalition.org/resource/report-small-merchants-on-interchange-value-more-important-than-cost-2/
Mukharlyamov, V., Sarin, N.	2019	The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Banks, Merchants, and Consumers	Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law	Analyzes the impact of the Durbin amendment, finding causal evidence that banks fully offset lost interchange fees by increasing other fees for consumers. Finds that the provision of free checking accounts decreased by 40 percent, and found little evidence of across-the-board consumer savings through merchants passing through interchange savings.	https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2046/
Mukharlyamov, V., Sarin, N.	2022	Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets: Empirical Evidence from Debit Cards	Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law	Similar to 2019 paper, analyzes the impact of price regulation in two-sided markets, focusing on debit cards following the implementation of the Durbin amendment. Finds that the regulation led to higher checking account fees paid by consumers. The amendment's effects impede its stated goal of enhancing consumer welfare.	https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2885/
Pierce, H., Robinson, I., Stratman, T.	2014	How are Small Banks Faring Under Dodd-Frank?	George Mason University, Mercatus Center	Analyzes a survey of 200 small banks to show that Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has adversely affected Durbin-exempt banks and their customers, with almost three-quarters of respondents reporting that the Durbin amendment in particular had a negative impact on their earnings.	https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Peirce_SmallBankSurvey_v1.pdf
Stillman, R.	2008	Regulatory Intervention in the Payment Card Industry by the Reserve Bank of Australia	CRA International	Examines the adverse effects of the Reserve Bank of Australia's regulation of interchange fees on consumers, including higher cardholder fees and curtailed reward programs.	https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-and-infrastructure/payments-system-regulation/past-regulatory-reviews/review-of-card-payment-systems-reforms/pdf/review-0708-pre-conclusions/cra-28042008-2.pdf
Wang, Z.	2012	Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation: Some Assessments and Considerations	Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond	Assesses the initial impact of the Durbin amendment on the electronic payments system, finding that the regulation substantially reduced the interchange revenues of large and small issuers, and adversely affected merchants specializing in small-ticket items.	https://www.richmondfed.org/~media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2012/q3/pdf/wang.pdf
Wang, Z., Schwartz, S., and Mitchell, N.	2014	The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Merchants: A Survey Study	Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond	Analyzes a survey of 420 merchants across 26 sectors, finding that merchants are not passing on the savings accrued through reduced interchange fees to consumers; more than three-fourths of merchants did not change their prices after the Durbin amendment was implemented, and 22% actually increased prices.	https://www.richmondfed.org/~media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2014/q3/pdf/wang.pdf

Author	Year	Title	Institution	Summary	Link
Zywicki, T., Manne, G., and Morris, J.	2014	Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange: The U.S. Experience	George Mason University, International Center for Law & Economics	Finds that the Durbin amendment has resulted in a net transfer of \$1-3 billion annually from low-income households to large retailers by inducing banks to reduce the availability of free checking accounts by half and double minimum balance requirements and monthly fees. Notes that merchants have failed to pass on their interchange cost savings to consumers.	https://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/icledurbin2014.pdf
Zywicki, T., Manne, G., and Morris, J.	2017	Unreasonable and Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small Businesses	George Mason University, International Center for Law & Economics	Finds that while the Durbin amendment has benefitted large retailers, it has harmed small businesses by driving up costs for local firms, community banks, and credit unions, and hurt consumers who have not seen any reduction in prices but who now face higher bank fees and minimum balance requirements. These effects are particularly acute among low-income households.	http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/icle-durbin_update_2017_final.pdf
Zywicki, T., Manne, G., and Morris, J.	2022	The Effects of Price Controls on Payment-Card Interchange Fees: A Review and Update	George Mason University, International Center for Law & Economics	Update of the 2017 paper; gives a theoretical overview of two-sided markets and the optimal interchange fee and finds that consumers and small merchants were harmed by interchange regulation.	https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Payments-2021-Lit-Review.pdf

ENDNOTES

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- ¹⁵ The regulation also permits an additional \$0.01 per transaction to cover banks' costs of fraud prevention.
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